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Introduction 
 
 
Containing Illicit Flows at African Borders 
Pitfalls for Europe 
Judith Vorrath 
The recent rise in migration to Europe has put borders and their security back on 
the political agenda of the European Union and its member states. Alongside stricter 
control of the Union’s external borders, border security also plays a growing role in 
cooperation with third states. The action plan adopted by European and African heads 
of state and government at the Valletta summit on migration in November 2015 in-
cludes assistance for strengthening national capacities at land, air and sea borders. 
In particular in the immediate southern neighbourhood, this support is intended to 
contribute to stemming irregular migration and human smuggling. European pro-
grammes to combat illicit flows and organised crime at borders outside the EU have 
existed for some time, for example to interrupt cocaine smuggling via West Africa. 
The experience to date reveals potential pitfalls of this approach and underlines the 
necessity to think beyond technical border management. 
 
The smuggling of migrants essentially 
refers to the profit-oriented facilitation 
of persons crossing borders illegally. Thus, 
in addition to saving lives, the European 
Union’s efforts to enhance protection of its 
external borders in the Mediterranean also 
aim at combatting transnational crime and 
disrupting migrant smuggling networks. 
This is also the objective of the EU’s Opera-
tion Sophia, launched in 2015, to which 
Germany contributes naval vessels and a 
contingent of up to 950 personnel. Although 
the mission has succeeded in rescuing 
migrants at sea and identifying individual 
traffickers on the boats, it has not succeed-
ed in undermining the business model of 
the organised networks along the central 
Mediterranean route. Confronted with a 
persistently strong demand for smuggling 
services, the EU and its member states 
are seeking possibilities to contain migrant 
movements before they reach the EU’s 
external borders. The key to this is inten-
sifying cooperation with third states in 
border protection and management. This 
year, through the Seahorse Mediterranean 
Network, the EU wants to boost the ability 
of North African, and above all Libyan, 
border security agencies to tackle irregular 
migration flows and illegal trade in their 
coastal regions and waters. But European 
actors are also pursuing initiatives to stop 
illicit flows – whether of people, or of goods 
such as drugs and arms – at the borders of 
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third states further afield than the immedi-
ate southern neighbourhood. Experience 
in West Africa, however, suggest that there 
can be drawbacks associated with this en-
gagement. 
Not all good things go together 
The formats used by the EU and its member 
states in cooperating with African countries 
to strengthen border security can be politi-
cally ambivalent, not only due to problem-
atic human rights situations and authori-
tarian governance in certain transit coun-
tries. They may more generally undermine 
the objective of stabilisation prioritised in 
the May 2017 Report on the Review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Promot-
ing peace and stability is also on Europe’s 
agenda for West African states like Mali, 
Niger and Nigeria, with which the EU is 
planning border management programmes 
as part of the migration partnerships con-
cluded in 2016. Even before this, the EU 
and its member states were supporting 
measures to improve border control capac-
ities and fight organised crime. These 
initiatives tend to rest on the assumption 
that Europe’s internal and external security 
interests readily converge in such projects. 
For example, interrupting cocaine traf-
ficking before the drugs reach European 
markets would at the same time deprive 
violent non-state actors in West African 
conflict regions of their smuggling rev-
enues. That calculation, however, under-
estimates the complexity of political power 
structures existing between state forces, 
non-state armed groups and criminal net-
works. These may include political-criminal 
arrangements that even persist or regroup 
after peace accords, as in the case of the 
2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconcilia-
tion in Mali. A largely isolated, technical 
approach to strengthening border security 
is therefore problematic: Firstly, because it 
can displace smuggling routes (for example 
into Mali’s unstable north in response to 
tighter controls in Niger) and a stronger 
security presence in smuggling hubs can 
generate tensions (already visible in Agadez 
in northern Niger). Secondly because migra-
tion partnerships boost the standing of gov-
ernments in affected states and increase 
their bargaining power, with – as in Mali – 
potential effects on the balance of power in 
peace processes. 
These complex linkages of conflicts 
and illicit economies mean that measures 
aiming at stabilisation and peacebuilding 
on the one hand and those addressing 
organised crime and border security and 
management on the other need to be better 
coordinated with one another. As empha-
sised by a study prepared for the United 
Nations Department of Political Affairs, 
alongside improving analytical capacities 
the crucial point is to weaken the political 
influence of criminal actors and ensure 
that UN interventions do not inadvertently 
facilitate illicit economies or criminal in-
filtration, for example of UN police reform 
programmes. This guidance should also 
apply to the EU, which already possesses 
excellent analytical capabilities, especially 
at Europol, and is at the same time present 
on the ground with civilian missions such 
as EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel 
Niger. While cooperation and coordination 
between EU missions and agencies is impor-
tant, very precisely defining the objectives 
of partnerships with third states is even 
more crucial, in order to avoid interference 
between measures in different areas. 
Capacity-building between 
“remote control” and local realities 
Before international attention increasingly 
turned to migration, Europe’s interest in 
addressing organised crime in West Africa 
centred largely on the flourishing drug 
trade. While the quantities seized fell ini-
tially, the region has apparently become 
more important as a transit route for South 
American cocaine again in recent years. 
According to the 2016 World Drug Report 
about 58 percent of the cocaine smuggled 
through Africa ends up in Europe – from 
West Africa apparently still mainly by sea 
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and air. The focus of drug enforcement is 
therefore primarily on the main entry and 
exit points than on controlling the borders 
as a whole. Thus in most West African 
states the EU’s Cocaine Route Programme 
launched in 2009 concentrates on enhanc-
ing surveillance and communications at 
international ports and airports. In some 
cases EU member states are also running 
their own projects there. Improving co-
operation between and within regions 
along the route represents another way 
of containing drug flows. In practice, the 
Cocaine Route Programme also contributes 
to combating illegal trade in other goods 
and irregular migration. It is, however not 
– as often claimed – working as a “remote 
control” for enforcing European security 
interests, given that the approaches of the 
EU and its member states at the interface 
of internal and external security are rarely 
coherent. Above all, capacity-building does 
not automatically translate into effective 
action against illicit flows and organised 
crime. The detection of individual cases of 
drugs or arms trafficking may have a cer-
tain deterrent effect, but frequently leads 
only to the arrest of “foot soldiers” at the 
borders. Furthermore, law enforcement 
agencies and courts in partner countries 
do not necessarily pursue cases energeti-
cally. While this approach may occasionally 
disrupt illicit trade flows it usually fails to 
break up the criminal networks behind it. 
In the case of high-value goods such as 
cocaine, seizure at borders outside the EU 
can at least cause sporadic financial losses 
if the amounts are large enough and the 
drugs are actually destroyed. But in the 
case of human smuggling, those inter-
cepted before reaching their destination 
will usually try anew, often relying on 
the services of traffickers again. 
The “comprehensive approach” propa-
gated in the EU’s own migration policy is 
therefore all the more important. However, 
an evaluation of EU support to border man-
agement and the fight against organised 
crime released in 2013 concluded that the 
engagement in West Africa had frequently 
been characterised by a narrow security 
focus on migration and that reform pro-
cesses had hardly been addressed. In im-
plementing the EU partnership with Mali 
the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 
until June 2017 supported above all 
projects in the area of security, including 
one to reinforce border control in central 
Mali. Even before the issue of migration 
became so prominent, West Africa’s land 
borders had been under scrutiny on account 
of the transnational circulation of small 
arms and the growing terrorist threat in 
certain West African states. But lack of trust 
between neighbouring states and diverging 
approaches to border management are not 
the only impediments to implementing 
projects for enhanced border protection. 
A strong security focus at land borders can 
also have negative side-effects. 
The political economy of 
porous borders 
A number of the coastal countries of West 
Africa are not only important transit points 
for the cocaine trade, but also among the 
main states of origin of African migrants 
seeking to reach Europe across the Mediter-
ranean. In the first four months of 2017 
almost half the roughly 37,000 trans-Medi-
terranean arrivals in Italy originated from 
Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire or The Gambia. 
This points attention to the national 
borders within the region, which are com-
monly seen as very porous due to many 
unofficial crossing points. These are also 
used by persons who – despite the existing 
arrangements for freedom of movement 
within the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) – are unwilling or 
unable to present the documents required 
to cross legally. Simply expanding the offi-
cial presence at these land borders, how-
ever, is not an adequate solution. Often 
enough the official crossing points act as 
obstacles to inter-regional trade and eco-
nomic integration. This was also the con-
clusion of an ECOWAS Task Force that 
visited seven West African states, when it 
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reported in May 2017. The practice of bribery 
to secure passage has negative effects on 
trade as well as security. And once a par-
ticular border regime has become estab-
lished, it is often difficult to soften or adapt 
it in the interests of cross-border coopera-
tion. Although the EU propagates the inte-
grated approach in border management, 
the balance between security and openness 
to legal movement of goods and persons is 
not always upheld in cooperation projects. 
Moreover, at land borders within the region 
informal arrangements and a prevalent 
smuggling economy are frequently of great 
significance for the borderlands themselves. 
For border communities that tend to be 
neglected by the state, the border is often 
an important economic factor as they can 
profit from smuggling and employment 
opportunities around official border cross-
ings. If measures are too heavily slanted 
towards repression, these sources of income 
may dry up. 
It must also be noted that authorities 
other than the official public ones may 
exercise influence and control at the bor-
ders, sometimes embedded in informal 
arrangements with the central state. Border 
management in many West African states 
involves local officials continuously re-
negotiating modalities with local authority 
figures and transnationally linked commu-
nities. When external measures ignore the 
specifics of the political economy of the 
periphery they are at best ineffectual – and 
can potentially even generate insecurity. A 
large-scale survey of residents along Tuni-
sia’s border with Libya found that more 
than 90 percent regarded restrictions on 
cross-border trade and the region’s under-
development as the principal sources of 
insecurity, rather than the terrorist threat 
upon which international attention focuses. 
Border communities should therefore be 
included in the process of building and 
enhancing the border security architecture, 
and an intensified state presence should 
not focus solely on the security sector. That 
is especially relevant in connection with 
measures funded through the Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa, which currently holds 
about €2.85 billion. The projects estab-
lished to realise its goals – amongst others 
promoting education and employment as 
well as border protection and management 
– need to be sensibly joined up. 
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